Investigating lineout performance between the top and bottom four English Premiership rugby union teams in the 2016/17 season by Migdalski, Adam & Stone, Joseph
Investigating lineout performance between the top and 
bottom four English Premiership rugby union teams in the 
2016/17 season
MIGDALSKI, Adam and STONE, Joseph <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9861-
4443>
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/23772/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
MIGDALSKI, Adam and STONE, Joseph (2019). Investigating lineout performance 
between the top and bottom four English Premiership rugby union teams in the 
2016/17 season. International journal of performance analysis in sport. 
Copyright and re-use policy
See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
Investigating lineout performance between the top and bottom four 1 
English Premiership rugby union teams in the 2016/17 season 2 
 3 
Adam Henryk Migdalski1 and Joseph Antony Stone1. 4 
1Academy of Sport and Physical Activity, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, United 5 
Kingdom 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
 12 
 13 
 14 
 15 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Joseph Stone, Academy 16 
of Sport and Physical Acitivy, Sheffield Hallam University, A213, Collegiate Hall, 17 
Collegiate Crescent, Sheffield, S10 2BP. Tel: +44 0114 225 5413; E-mail: 18 
joseph.stone@shu.ac.uk.  19 
 20 
21 
Investigating lineout performance between the top and bottom four 22 
Premiership rugby union teams in the 2016/17 season 23 
This study investigated lineout performance between the top and bottom four 24 
English Premiership rugby union teams during the 2016/17 season. A season long 25 
review was conducted analysing all of the top four (n = 1152) and bottom four 26 
teams’ (n = 1124) lineouts. Findings showed the number of tries scored 27 
originating from a lineout play for the top four teams’ (1.57 tries per match) was 28 
higher in comparison to the bottom four teams’ (1.10 tries per match) (p < 0.05). 29 
Lineout success did not change between the top (87%) and bottom (85%) four 30 
teams (p > 0.05). However, the top four teams were more effective in stealing 31 
opposition possession at a lineout (17%) compared to the bottom four teams (9%, 32 
p < 0.05). Additionally, top four teams showed a more forwards orientated style 33 
of play using binding actions (top = 62%, bottom = 56%, p < 0.05) and maul 34 
formation (top = 55%, bottom = 47%, p < 0.05). These results suggest coaches 35 
should focus on analysis of opposition tactics in lineout play in an aim to develop 36 
effective strategies to steal opposition possession at a lineout.   37 
Keywords: contesting strategies; key performance indicators; lineouts; rugby 38 
union; performance analysis 39 
 40 
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1. Introduction  49 
Rugby union is a team invasion sport which has seen a growth in popularity 50 
becoming a more commercialised, business orientated game with a larger emphasis 51 
placed on maximising performance through the use of analytical and scientific support 52 
(Austin, Gabbett, & Jenkins, 2011; Owen & Weatherson, 2004; Vaz, Mouchet, Carreras 53 
& Morente, 2011). Analytical support is traditionally used by a method of notational 54 
analysis which provides an objective way of quantifying performance in a reliable 55 
manner (Hughes & Franks, 2015). An essential component of analysis in rugby union 56 
match play is the ‘lineout’, which is a way of restarting the game once the ball has 57 
passed the plane of touch and allows for a quick, safe and fair competition for the ball 58 
(World Rugby, 2017). Two lines of players from opposing sides form within the 5 and 59 
15-meter lines on the field of play with at least a meter gap separating them. The 60 
attacking side dictates the number of players committed to the lineout and the 61 
opposition can have an equal number or fewer players to contest for possession. An 62 
attacking player stood beyond the plane of touch (generally referred to as the ‘hooker’) 63 
throws the ball in an overhead manner down the centre of the two lines of players to 64 
allow the teams to contest for possession (World Rugby, 2017).  65 
Sayers (2011) suggested lineouts are an important aspect of a team’s attacking 66 
game because they are an excellent try scoring modality, with lineout success shown to 67 
be a factor that attributes to winning a match (Hughes & White, 1991; Jones, Mellalieu 68 
& James, 2004; Vaz et al., 2011). Winning teams typically have a greater percentage of 69 
success in winning the oppositions ball during the lineout in domestic European rugby 70 
as well as the Six Nations Championship (SNC) (Jones et al., 2004; Ortega Villarejo, & 71 
Palao, 2009). While losing teams have a greater number of lineouts lost (Ortega et al., 72 
2009). However, conflicting research suggests that lineout performance may not always 73 
act as a key discriminator in determining match outcome (Bishop & Barnes, 2013; 74 
Ortega et al., 2009; Vaz, Rooyen & Sampaio, 2010). For example, no differences were 75 
found in lineout success between winning and losing teams in the 2011 Rugby World 76 
Cup (RWC) knockout stages (Bishop & Barnes, 2013). Bishop and Barnes (2013) 77 
suggested the reason for not finding differences in lineout statistics was due to the 78 
importance of lineout success being highlighted as an area of success in the modern 79 
game and therefore an increased emphasis was placed on having a successful lineout. 80 
Since 2000 onwards there was an increase in defending teams contesting the 81 
throwing in teams’ lineout and using it as a method of regaining possession (Quarrie & 82 
Hopkins, 2007). Contesting a lineout can be defined by a player from the defending 83 
team being lifted by a player from his own team in the lineout in an attempt to win 84 
possession on the oppositions throw in (Eaves & Hughes, 2003; Quarrie & Hopkins, 85 
2007). Vaz et al. (2010) suggested winning teams when defending had a greater success 86 
rate in ‘stealing’ the attacking teams’ lineout ball. However, with no differences found 87 
in number of lineouts stolen per game to make this conclusion further research would 88 
have to be conducted into contesting strategies used by opposition teams to support this 89 
statement (Vaz et al., 2010).  In addition, Vaz et al. (2010) suggested that contesting 90 
strategies may be more effective in winning teams as stolen lineouts can be convert into 91 
possession which may result in point scoring opportunities. However, a KPI of ‘lineouts 92 
lost’ was recorded (Vaz et al., 2010; Vaz et al., 2011), this could indicate that the 93 
lineout was lost due to attacking error or the opposition stealing possession. Hence, 94 
further detailed KPI’s are required to understand if it is poor attacking play, or good 95 
defensive play leading to success in the lineout. This would enable the effectiveness of 96 
contesting strategies used by defending teams at a lineout to be examined.   97 
Although lineouts in rugby have been suggested as being a key component in 98 
rugby union, limited research has performed a detailed analysis specially focused on the 99 
lineouts. One exception is Franken, van Vuuren, Kraak and Vaz (2017) who 100 
investigated lineout statistics between the SNC and The Rugby Championship (TRC) 101 
including lineout formations, pitch locations of the lineouts, throwing targets, actions 102 
during the lineout and actions post lineout. Franken et al. (2017) concluded that most 103 
lineouts occurred in an attacking area between the 22 m line and the halfway line with 104 
binding formation followed by pass being the most utilised formats. Although research 105 
has highlighted the importance of lineout performance there is a lack of research 106 
explaining what the reasons are for these differences in performance.  Furthermore, 107 
research has traditionally focussed on international matches indicating a gap in literature 108 
for investigating performance in domestic level rugby (Bishop & Barnes, 2013; Franken 109 
et al., 2017; Orterga et al., 2011).  110 
Therefore, this study aims to analyse lineout statistics and contesting strategies 111 
between successful (top four) and unsuccessful (bottom four) teams within the English 112 
rugby Premiership. This aim will help to clarify whether scoring or conceding tries from 113 
a lineout attributes to a team being more successful across a season and the importance 114 
of contesting strategies.  115 
2. Methods 116 
2.1 Design and sample 117 
Following institutional ethical approval eight teams were selected for analysis 118 
based on their final league position during the 2016/17 Premiership season (the 4 119 
highest and 4 lowest ranked teams, see table 1). The sample included all matches played 120 
by the eight teams within the regular season (n = 120 matches) in which every lineout 121 
taken (n = 2276; top four n = 1152; bottom four n =1124) was analysed. The ‘play off’ 122 
matches (for teams finishing in the top four) were excluded from the study to avoid an 123 
imbalance in number of games played between the two sets of teams.  124 
 125 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 126 
2.2 Performance indicators 127 
Guided by previous literature (e.g. Franken et al., 2017; Hughes & Bartlett, 128 
2002) a series of KPI’s were derived. These were; successful lineouts, unsuccessful 129 
lineouts, formation, zonal location, intended target, actions during lineout, actions after 130 
lineout, scores originating in lineouts and contesting strategies used to compete for 131 
opposition ball. Operational definitions of these KPI’s can be found in table 2 and the 132 
zonal locations are described in figure 1.  133 
 134 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 135 
 136 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 137 
2.3 Procedure 138 
Each rugby match was downloaded from Elitehub© (Version 2017.12.1137) and 139 
analysed using SportsCode Elite (Version 9.0, Sportstech, Warriewood, Australia). The 140 
matches were coded by an experienced professional analyst, with in-depth knowledge 141 
of rugby union. The analysis took place by coding each lineout using the KPI’s defined 142 
in table two. The data was then exported from SportsCode into Microsoft Excel 2013 143 
(Microsoft Corporation, Washington, USA) for data processing.  144 
2.4 Reliability  145 
Intra-rater reliability was examined by randomly selecting two games (65 146 
lineouts) which were reanalysed 2 weeks post initial analysis by the primary analyst (in 147 
line with Hughes, Barnes, Churchill, & Stone, 2017).  For each KPI’s, Cohen’s Kappa 148 
Coefficient was used as an assessment of reliability. Using classification of Kappa 149 
values (Altman, 1990) the system showed a very good level of agreement (ranging from 150 
0.88 to 1.00) across the range of KPI’s coded (see Table 3) 151 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 152 
2.5 Data analysis 153 
Data analysis was conducted using Microsoft Excel 2013 (Microsoft 154 
Corporation, Washington, USA) and SPSS 24.0 (IBM Corporation, New York, USA). 155 
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality revealed the data to be non-normally 156 
distributed across all KPI’s.  Therefore, non-parametric tests were used for statistical 157 
analysis of the data. A series of Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to identify 158 
statistical differences between the top four and bottom four teams. Statistical 159 
significance was accepted at a 95% level. To allow for comparison of data descriptive 160 
statistics were presented in absolute and percentage values (means and standard 161 
deviations). Cohen’s d effect size (ES) testing was conducted across all variables with 162 
Cohen’s (1992) criteria for effect size tests used for interpreting findings; ES ≥ 0.1 <0.3 163 
indicating a small effect, ES ≥ 0.3 < 0.5 indicating a medium effect and ES ≥ 0.5 164 
indicating a large effect.  165 
3. Results 166 
Table two presents descriptive statistics as well as Cohen’s Effect Sizes between 167 
the top and bottom four teams (see table 4). The top four team’s number of lineouts per 168 
game did not differ significantly from the bottom four teams number of lineouts per 169 
game, U = 3918, z = .138, p = .890, d = 0.006.  170 
 171 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 172 
3.1 Tries from lineouts 173 
The number of tries scored originating from a lineout play for top four teams’ 174 
was significantly higher than the number of tries scored originating in lineout play for 175 
bottom four teams’, U = 3121, z = -2.312, p = .021, d = 0.39. In addition, the number of 176 
tries conceded from a lineout play for top four teams’ was significantly lower than 177 
number of tries conceded from a lineout play for bottom four teams’, U = 5183, z = 178 
4.036, p < .001, d = 0.66.  179 
3.2 Lineout Success 180 
Top four teams’ lineout success percentage did not differ significantly from 181 
bottom four teams’ lineout success percentage, U = 3654, z = -0.65, p = .519, d = 0.05. 182 
The percentage of unsuccessful lineouts due to attacking error for the top four teams’ 183 
did not differ significantly from the bottom four teams’, U = 3612, z = -.786, p = .432, d 184 
= 0.09. Top four teams’ percentage of unsuccessful lineouts due to opposition stealing 185 
possession did not differ significantly from bottom four teams’ U = 4405, z = 1.68, p = 186 
.094, d = 0.02.  187 
3.3 Zones  188 
Percentage of lineouts that occurred in Zone A for the top four teams did not 189 
differ significantly from the bottom four teams, U = 3482, z = -1.16, p = .248, d = 0.21. 190 
Percentage of lineouts that occurred in Zone B for the top four teams did not differ 191 
significantly from the bottom four teams, U = 4453, z = 1.72, p = .085, d = 0.18.  192 
Percentage of lineouts that occurred in Zone C for top four teams did not differ 193 
significantly from bottom four teams, U = 3909, z = .113, p = .910, d = 0.04. Percentage 194 
of lineouts that occurred in Zone D for the top four teams did not differ significantly 195 
from bottom four teams, U = 3735, z = -.411, p = .681, d = 0.05.  196 
3.4 Formation 197 
The percentage of 7-man lineout formations for the top four teams did not differ 198 
significantly from the bottom four teams, U = 3857, z = -.043, p = .966, d = 0.02. 199 
Across the remaining lineout formations which include; 3, 4, 5 and 6 man lineouts there 200 
were also no significant differences found between the top and bottom four teams (all p 201 
> .05).   202 
3.5 Intended Target 203 
The percentage of lineouts with a front intended target for top four teams (Mdn 204 
did not differ significantly from bottom four teams, U = 3735, z = -.411, p = .681, d = 205 
0.06. Percentage of lineouts with a middle intended target for top four teams did not 206 
differ significantly from the bottom four teams, U = 3784, z = -.259, p = .796, d = 0.00. 207 
Percentage of lineouts with a back intended for top four teams did not differ 208 
significantly from bottom four teams, U = 3704, z = -.495, p = .621, d = 0.11. 209 
3.6 Action during 210 
Bottom four teams had a significantly higher percentage of off the top actions 211 
during the lineout than top four teams, U = 4536, z = 1.968, p = .049, d = 0.38. 212 
Whereas, top four teams had a significantly higher percentage of binding actions during 213 
the lineout than bottom four teams, U = 2982, z = -2.634, p = .008, d = 0.29. All other 214 
actions during the lineout; overthrow, slap and direct transfer showed no significant 215 
differences (all p > .05).  216 
3.7 Actions post 217 
Top four teams had a significantly higher percentage of maul actions post 218 
lineout than bottom four teams, U = 2979, z = -2.644, p = .008, d = 0.36. All other 219 
actions post lineout; pass, kick, ruck and carry showed no significant differences (all p > 220 
.05) (see table 5). 221 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 222 
3.8 Contest  223 
The top four teams’ percentage of lineouts contested on opposition ball did not 224 
differ significantly from the bottom four teams, U = 3615, z = -.761, p = .447, d = 0.02. 225 
However, top four teams’ percentage of successful contests on opposition was 226 
significantly higher than bottom four teams’ percentage of successful contests, U = 227 
2560, z = -3.984, p = .000, d = 0.54.  Bottom four teams’ percentage of lineouts 228 
contested on 7-man formation was significantly higher than top four teams’ percentage 229 
of lineouts contested on 7-man formation, U = 4870, z = 3.132, p = .002, d = 0.41. 230 
Across all other formations; 3, 4, 5, and 6-man the percentage of contested lineouts did 231 
not differ significantly between top and bottom four teams (all p > .05). In addition, 232 
percentage of lineouts contested in Zones; A, B, C and D did not differ significantly 233 
between top and bottom four teams (all p > .05).  234 
4. Discussion 235 
The aim of this study was to analyse lineout statistics and contesting strategies 236 
between the top and bottom four rugby teams in the English Premiership. Analysis 237 
indicated that the top four teams (1.57 tries per game) were more effective at using 238 
lineouts as a platform to score tries than the bottom four teams (1.10 tries per game). In 239 
addition, results demonstrate the top four teams conceded less tries from lineouts (0.89 240 
tries per game) than bottom four teams (1.63 tries per game) proposing the top 4 had a 241 
more effective defence following a lineout. 242 
Importantly, despite more tries being scored from lineouts by successful teams, 243 
lineout success was not significantly different between the top (87%) and bottom four 244 
teams (85%) supporting previous findings that lineout success is not a discriminatory 245 
factor in winning matches (Bishop & Barnes, 2013; Vaz et al., 2010). Rather, our data 246 
suggests the ability to win possession on opposition ball could be a more important 247 
factor in influencing match outcome and league positions. Although the top four teams 248 
did not contest a greater number of lineouts (57%) than the bottom four teams (55%), 249 
the top four teams had a significantly higher success rate (17%) than bottom four teams 250 
(9%) when contesting the ball. This finding suggests that top four teams are more 251 
effective in ‘stealing’ opposition possession at a lineout and could be an important 252 
factor for successful performance (Vaz et al., 2010). Vaz et al. (2011) suggested that 253 
winning teams enjoyed a greater success rate on stealing opposition ball having found 254 
that losing teams lose more lineouts than winning teams. The present study adds clarity 255 
to previous research that used a KPI of ‘lineouts lost’ (Vaz et al., 2010; Vaz et al., 256 
2011), this could indicate that the lineout was lost due to attacking error or the 257 
opposition stealing possession. With the present study using ‘successful contesting 258 
strategies’ as a KPI this clearly identifies that the top four teams were more successful 259 
in stealing opposition possession at a lineout and this was not due to an attacking error. 260 
A further important finding was that bottom four teams contested 7-man lineouts 261 
more times (29%) than top four teams (20%). With 7-man formations generally being 262 
used to have more players involved in setting up an effective maul post lineout (Franken 263 
et al., 2017), top four teams may choose to not contest 7-man lineouts but stay on the 264 
ground to defend the maul post lineout. In addition, research has suggested that 265 
successful teams enjoy greater forward dominance in matches (Hughes & White, 1997) 266 
which might indicate why bottom four teams choose to contest to win possession at the 267 
lineout rather than attempt to defend the subsequent driving maul. When lifting a player 268 
in the air to contest possession at the lineout this can leave the defensive team with less 269 
players on the ground to then defend a driving maul and subsequently could be the 270 
reason as to why more tries are scored, particularly if the lineout is close to the try line. 271 
Future research is required to further investigate whether tries come from mauls or from 272 
phases after the lineout and in which zone they originated.  273 
Analysis of actions during the lineout showed that top four teams used binding 274 
actions more times (62%) than bottom four teams (56%). This tactic has been 275 
considered by previous research as a safer option in terms of being able to retain 276 
possession (Franken et al., 2017). Additionally, actions post lineout often depend upon 277 
actions during the lineout and as previously mentioned top four teams opt for binding 278 
actions during the lineout which is how mauls are formed. This can offer explanation as 279 
to why the top four teams went into maul actions following a lineout significantly more 280 
times (55%) than bottom four teams (47%). A maul is also considered as a safer option 281 
in securing possession rather than distributing possession to the backs immediately post 282 
lineout (Franken et al., 2017). With the top four teams enjoying this greater forward 283 
dominance this may be why bottom four teams choose to use off the top actions 284 
significantly more (28%) than top four teams (23%) in an attempt to distribute the ball 285 
to the backs away from opposition forwards.  286 
Investigating frequency of contests in different zone locations found no 287 
significant differences indicating that zone location was not a factor in determining 288 
whether teams contested possession at a lineout. An aspect of zone location that may 289 
see differences is in which zone teams enjoyed greater success in stealing opposition 290 
possession which is an area of further research. In addition, an area that could identify 291 
differences is what the intended target at the lineout was when the ball is stolen. For 292 
example, whether this occurs more often when the ball this thrown to the back of the 293 
lineout which can be perceived as a more difficult skill (Kraak, Venter, & Coetzee, 294 
2016).  295 
5. Conclusion 296 
In conclusion, this study demonstrates successful teams score more tries from 297 
lineouts than less successful teams. Although lineout success was not found to be 298 
different between the top and bottom four teams, top four teams did enjoy a greater 299 
success rate while contesting the ball. This indicates although lineout success is an 300 
important factor, success rate on the opposition ball is also a critical factor that can 301 
influence team succus. Here, the data supports the practical recommendations to players 302 
and coaches that an area of training and analysis should be focussed on attempting to 303 
steal opposition possession at a lineout. Finally, this study presents findings which 304 
suggest that top four teams use a more forward originated approach to lineouts in that 305 
they choose to use maul actions more frequently post lineout as well as securing 306 
possession through binding actions during a lineout. 307 
 308 
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Table 1. The finishing positions of the top and bottom four teams’ in the 362 
Premiership 2016/17 season once all matches had been played including total 363 
points. 364 
Position Team Points 
1st Wasps 84 
2nd Exeter Chiefs 84 
3rd Saracens 77 
4th Leicester Tigers 66 
9th Gloucester 46 
10th Sale Sharks 40 
11th Worcester Warriors 33 
12th Bristol 20 
 365 
 366 
 367 
 368 
 369 
 370 
 371 
 372 
 373 
 374 
 375 
 376 
 377 
 378 
 379 
 380 
 381 
 382 
 383 
 384 
Table 2. KPI’s with operational definitions (adapted from Franken et al., 2017).  385 
KPI Definition 
Successful Lineout  Lineout won by attacking team  
Unsuccessful Lineout 
(Attacking Error) 
Lineout lost by attacking team due to: Not straight throw, free-kick/penalty 
conceded, handling error, overthrow. 
Unsuccessful Lineout 
(Opposition Steal)  
Lineout won by defending team 
Zonal Location 
(See figure 1) 
Zone A: Attacking area between try line and 22m line 
Zone B: Attacking area between 22m line and halfway line 
Zone C: Defending area between halfway line and 22m line 
Zone D: Defending area between 22m line and try line 
 
Formation 3-man: Three attacking players in lineout 
4-man: Four attacking players in lineout 
5-man: Five attacking players in lineout 
6-man: Six attacking players in lineout 
7-man: Seven attacking players in lineout 
 
Intended Target Front: First third of the 15m area 
Middle: Second third of the 15m area 
Back: Final third of the 15m area 
 
Action During Lineout: 
(What the player who 
catches the ball does with 
it) 
Off the top: When the player who caught the ball in the lineout throws the ball 
to the scrum-half whilst still in the air 
Tap-back: When the ball is knocked back in a controlled or uncontrolled 
fashion by the player being lifted 
Over throw: When the thrower throws the ball over the intended target 
Binding formation: When teammates of the player who caught the ball bind 
onto him 
Direct transfer: When the ball is passed to another player standing in the 
lineout. 
 
Action After Lineout: 
(Play directly after 
lineout) 
Pass: When the ball carrier passes the ball to a teammate  
Kick: When the ball carrier kicks away possession. 
To deck: When only the ball carrier goes directly to ground 
To maul: When the ball carrier is held up by an opponent and at least one of 
his team mates is binding onto him 
Carry: When the ball carrier immediately breaks away from the lineout 
 
Try scored originating 
from lineout  
Whether a try was scored as a result of a lineout (from phase play after the 
lineout or maul) 
 
Try conceded originating 
from lineout 
Whether a try was conceded as a result of a lineout (from phase play after the 
lineout or maul) 
 
Contesting Strategies 
 
 
Contest: When a player on the defending team jumps or is lifted by teammates 
to compete for opposition ball. 
No Contest: Defending teams stay down and do not contest for the ball.  
Zonal locations: Which zone of the field of play do defending teams contest, 
A, B, C, D. 
 386 
Table 3. Intra-observer reliability values for the notional analysis data quantified 387 
through the calculation of Cohen’s Kappa Co-efficient.  388 
KPI KAPPA 
Lineout Success 1.00 
Formation 0.89 
Zonal Location 1.00 
Intended Target 0.88 
Actions During 1.00 
Actions After 1.00 
Tries Originating  1.00 
Contest  1.00 
Contest Success 1.00 
Contest Formation 0.91 
Contest Zonal Location 1.00 
 389 
  390 
 391 
 392 
 393 
 394 
 395 
 396 
 397 
 398 
 399 
 400 
 401 
 402 
 403 
 404 
 405 
 406 
 407 
 408 
 409 
 410 
Table 4. Comparison of KPI’s including effect sizes for the 2016/17 Aviva Premiership 411 
season between the top four and bottom four teams. 412 
 Top 4 Bottom 4  
KPIs F Mean SD % F Mean SD % d-value 
Lineouts 1152 12.94 3.63 - 1124 12.92 3.62 - .006 
Try scored 140 1.57* 1.36 - 96 1.10* 1.05 - 0.39 
Try conceded 79 0.89* 0.96 - 145 1.67* 1.38 - 0.66 
Zone A 324 3.64 2.28 28 278 3.20 1.97 25 0.21 
Zone B 449 5.04 2.65 39 478 5.49 2.33 43 0.18 
Zone C 267 3.00 1.83 23 267 3.07 1.69 24 0.04 
Zone D 112 1.26 1.19 10 101 1.16 1.15 8 0.09 
Successful 998 11.21 3.37 87 961 11.05 3.39 85 0.05 
Unsuccessful: 
Attacking Error 
88 0.99 0.91 7 79 0.91 0.92 7 0.09 
Unsuccessful: 
Opposition Steal 
64 0.72 0.95 6 84 0.95 1.11 8 0.22 
Quick Throw in  28 0.31 0.56 2 30 0.34 0.61 3 0.05 
3 man 12 0.13 0.46 1 9 0.10 0.31 1 0.08 
4-man 24 0.27 0.52 2 28 0.32 0.62 2 0.09 
5-man 332 3.73 2.03 29 341 3.92 1.89 30 0.10 
6-man 449 5.04 2.37 39 422 4.85 2.79 38 0.07 
7-man 335 3.76 2.21 29 324 3.72 2.48 29 0.02 
Front 540 6.07 2.60 47 543 6.23 2.70 48 0.06 
Middle 377 4.24 1.85 33 369 4.24 2.28 33 0 
Back 234 2.63 1.76 20 212 2.44 1.71 19 0.11 
Off the top 245 2.75* 1.63 23 291 3.34* 1.95 28 0.38 
Tap-back 90 1.01 1.19 8 100 1.15 1.03 10 0.13 
Overthrow 54 0.61 0.81 6 51 0.59 0.79 5 0.02 
Bind 663 7.45* 2.76 62 574 6.60* 3.03 56 0.29 
Direct transfer 14 0.16 0.40 1 11 0.13 0.37 1 0.08 
Pass 347 3.90 1.94 35 380 4.37 2.33 39 0.22 
Kick 11 0.12 0.39 1 16 0.18 0.47 2 0.14 
To deck 27 0.30 0.63 2 41 0.47 0.87 4 0.22 
To maul 548 6.16* 2.56 55 452 5.20* 2.73 47 0.36 
Carry 70 0.79 0.90 7 79 0.91 0.95 8 0.13 
Notes. KPIs – Key performance indicators, F - Frequency, SD - Standard deviation, d – Cohen’s 413 
effect size, * indicates p < 0.05.  414 
 415 
 416 
 417 
Table 5. Comparison of contesting strategies KPI’s including effect sizes for the 418 
2016/17 Aviva Premiership season between the top four and bottom four teams. 419 
 Top 4 Bottom 4  
KPIs F Mean SD % F Mean SD % d-value 
Contest 642 7.21 2.90 57 615 7.07 2.85 55 0.02 
Successful 
Contest 
110 1.24* 1.23 17 56 0.64* 0.99 9 0.54 
Contest Zone A 67 0.75 0.86 11 67 0.77 0.98 11 0.02 
Contest Zone B 176 1.98 1.34 27 162 1.86 1.47 26 0.09 
Contest Zone C 292 3.27 1.97 45 271 3.11 1.74 44 0.09 
Contest Zone D 107 1.19 1.14 17 115 1.32 1.23 19 0.11 
Contest 3 man 6 0.07 0.25 1 6 0.07 0.25 1 0 
Contest 4-man 37 0.42 0.77 6 26 0.30 0.70 5 0.16 
Contest 5-man 224 2.51 1.62 35 185 2.13 1.59 30 0.24 
Contest 6-man 244 2.73 1.70 38 218 2.51 1.63 35 0.13 
Contest 7-man 131 1.47* 1.38 20 180 2.07* 1.51 29 0.41 
Notes. KPIs – Key performance indicators, F - Frequency, SD - Standard deviation, d – Cohen’s 420 
effect size, * indicates p < 0.05. 421 
 422 
Figure 1. Illustration of the pitch being divided into various zonal locations (adapted 423 
from Van Rooyen, Diedrick, & Noakes, 2010).  424 
 425 
 426 
 427 
 428 
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